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Does Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision 
of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidence  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Many publicly provided goods are rivalrous in terms of consumption (and thus would 
be classified as ‘impure’ public goods). While people may have the same rights to access them, 
spatial or timely distances make access easier for some people than for others. For instance, the 
location of a hospital, fire brigade headquarters or generally public infrastructure determine to 
some extent the benefit one derives from the usufruct of such local public goods. If exclusion of 
free-riders from the consumption of a public good is impossible, the allocation decision gives 
some people, in particular those who live in the neighborhood, preferred access to local public 
goods. If these goods are financed by voluntary contributions, incentives to free-ride do exist.1
 In this paper we assume that a public project creates different payoffs to different 
contributors. Within this environment we study two institutions: Rank Order Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism (hereafter Rank-Order-VCM) and Random Order Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism (hereafter Random-Order-VCM). In Rank-Order-VCM individuals 
compete with their observable contributions towards a public project for a larger share of the 
payoff that the project generates. Rank-Order-VCM ensures that people who contributed more 
(and thus earned a larger share of the payoff) are less likely to feel taken advantage of as it has 
often been reported by subjects in a voluntary contribution mechanism experiments.
 
However, through the allocation decision the planer can implement a rewarding system in which 
free-riding incentives are counteracted. 
2
                                                 
1 A specific example is financing a cultural event (e.g., a theater play) through voluntary contributions with the 
person who contributed more receiving higher quality seats. In the same fashion, a person who exerts more effort 
would earn a larger share of the profit in a team production scenario or airlines with higher contributions towards the 
airport would get their preferred time slots (instead of participating in an auction). 
 To test 
whether Rank-Order-VCM overcomes the free-rider problem we design a laboratory experiment 
2 For details on conditional cooperation see Keser and van Winden (2000), Fischbacher et al. (2001), Burlando and 
Guala (2005), Kurzban and Houser (2005), Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2006), Chaudhuri (2007) or Neugebauer 
et al. (2009). 
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studying the impact of competition on voluntary contributions and compare it to Random-Order-
VCM -- an institution that allocates the shares from the public project randomly. 
 Many papers, both theoretical and experimental, have identified the free-rider problem 
in organizational and societal settings (see Ledyard, 1995 for a review). A small but growing 
research stream identifies institutions that mitigate or completely eliminate this problem (Kosfeld 
and Riedl, 2004 review the literature). Other papers test these institutions experimentally.  It is 
this literature to which we wish to contribute.  
 One type of institution that has been proposed to alleviate free-riding involves 
experimenter-imposed sanctions and rewards (e.g., Dickinson and Isaac, 1998; Falkinger et al., 
2000; Dickinson, 2001; Orrison et al., 2004; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005; Croson et al., 2006). 
Some designs from this line of research are somewhat close to ours as they involve an element of 
competition. However, the competition is not their main focus and therefore these papers cannot 
provide a direct answer whether it is capable of increasing contributions on its own: Dickinson 
(2001) investigates an institution in which all members of the group but the most cooperative one 
have to incur a fixed fine and the most cooperative member receives a reward in form of a fixed 
bonus payment. Orrison et al. (2004) and Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005) use a tournament 
incentive structure involving rewards for winners and sanctions for losers. These studies find that 
the additional incentives provide a large initial boost to cooperation, which diminishes over time. 
In Falkinger et al. (2000), subjects pay a tax if they contribute below the average contribution and 
receive a subsidy if they contribute above it. The authors find not only a significant initial effect 
on contributions but also increasing cooperation over time.  
 A considerable body of research has followed a related study by Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) on participant-imposed punishment where the main result hinges on the existence of a 
social norm rather then on competition. Nevertheless, their design is too distant from the above 
mentioned papers to permit an across-study conclusion about the effects of competition. In Fehr 
and Gächter’s experiment, group members observe the individual contributions and are able to 
inflict a pecuniary sanction on other members by incurring a cost. Initially the effect on 
cooperation is small, but contributions increase to high levels as time progresses. Subsequent 
experiments show that similar impacts on contributions may be obtained even with non-pecuniary 
sanctions (e.g., Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). However, with non-pecuniary 
sanctions, contributions do not increase over time.   
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 More recent work uses endogenous or exogenous group formation to mitigate the free-
rider problem. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) and Maier-Rigaud et al. (2005) allow participants to 
expel group members based on a majority vote. Their results show high levels of contribution 
among non-expelled members. In experiments related to local public goods, individuals decide in 
which group to participate (e.g., Erhard and Keser 1999; Ahn et al. 2008). In majority of these 
studies the effect on cooperation due to this voluntary group selection is negligible, as free-riders 
infiltrate groups with high contributions. In our design, more specifically in Rank-Order-VCM it 
is impossible for free-riders to take advantage of cooperators to the same degree because they are 
automatically getting a smaller share of the profit.  
 In experiments on exogenous group formation, individuals are re-sorted by the 
experimenter into homogeneous groups of high contributors and low contributors, either with or 
without their ex-ante explicit knowledge (Page et al., 2005; Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Caberera et 
al., 2006; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007, 2009).  In these papers, high levels of contribution can be 
sustained in the cooperative groups, but not in the noncooperative groups. Hence, average 
contributions decline over time. 
Next we present the experimental setup and our results, followed by a short discussion. 
Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
 
 2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 2.1 Rank Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
In Rank-Order-VCM, each subject from a group of four faces the following decision 
problem: How much of the initial endowment (50 NZ cents) to contribute to a project and how 
much of it to keep. Each cent kept generates payoff only to the given subject, each cent 
contributed towards a project generates payoff to all the members of the group. The final payoff 
then equals the sum of the money kept plus the sum allocated to the project by the four members 
of the group times the individual multiplier. The individual multiplier is determined by the 
amount allocated to the project by the given subject and the amount allocated by the other 
participants in his or her group. Given the allocation of the others in the group, the higher the 
allocation of the subject to the project the higher are his or her chances for a larger multiplier. In 
particular: 
o If the subject’s allocation is the highest in the group, his or her multiplier (= 
 
 
5 
marginal return) is 0.65.  
o If the subject’s allocation is the second highest in the group, his or her multiplier is 
0.55. 
o If the subject’s allocation is the third highest in the group, his or her multiplier is 
0.45. 
o If the subject’s allocation is the lowest in the group, his or her multiplier is 0.35. 
In case of a tie, i.e., if two or more participants allocate the same amount to the project, the 
corresponding multipliers are averaged. For instance, if the highest allocation is equal to the 
second highest, the multiplier for the two participants is 0.6 [= (0.65 + 0.55)/2]. If all four 
subjects contribute the same the multiplier for each one of them is 0.5. Hence, participants who 
allocate the same amount to the project get the same payoff and the average marginal per capita 
return from the project is 0.5. 
 In Rank-Order-VCM, individuals are rewarded based on their contribution towards a 
group project. Although the unique Nash equilibrium is the situation where everyone free-rides, it 
is not a dominant strategy equilibrium as in VCM. From the perspective of neoclassical game 
theory this is the most crucial change in the game structure. However, there is a more subtle 
change; conditional cooperators are not being exploited as in VCM because higher cooperation is 
rewarded by a larger share for which the group members compete. 
 If we were to observe a different behavior in Rank-Order-VCM than in VCM it would 
not obvious whether it is due to competition or not. In particular, Rank-Order-VCM and the 
standard VCM differ in two additional aspects: the payoff structure and the fact that subjects 
learn about their marginal returns after the decision has been made as opposed to knowing what 
the marginal per capita return before the decision is made as in the case of VCM. Therefore, one 
needs to design a more appropriate baseline with identical payoff structure to Rank-Order-VCM 
to allow for such conclusion. 
 
 2.2 Random Rank Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
 The Random-Rank-VCM is our control treatment. It implements an identical payoff 
structure as Rank-Order-VCM by randomly assigning ranks (with replacement) to all members of 
the group. Just as before, the individual marginal returns from a project are equal 0.65, 0.55, 0.45, 
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or 0.35, based on this random rank. In case of a tie, the marginal returns get averaged. Subjects 
learn their marginal returns after the decisions are made. 
 Although the free-riding equilibrium is unique, we expect that the involved competition 
in Rank-Order-VCM induces an upward shift towards the efficient allocation. In some (non-
equilibrium) instances more cooperative individuals may earn more than the less cooperative 
ones. Thus, we expect a significantly higher contribution levels in Rank-Order-VCM than 
Random-Rank-VCM.  
 
 2.3 Procedures 
The experiment consisted of two treatments implemented in an across subjects design. All 
sessions were conducted in May 2007 in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. A total of 64 undergraduate subjects were recruited for 
the experiment. Most of the subjects had not previously participated in economics experiments 
(and none had participated in a social dilemma experiment). Each subject only participated in a 
single session of the study. We ran 4 sessions with exactly 16 subjects in each session. On 
average, a session lasted 75 minutes including initial instructional period and payment of 
subjects. Subjects earned on average 23.51 NZD. We did not pay a show up fee. All earnings 
were calculated in New Zealand cents. All sessions were computerized and run under single blind 
social distance protocol. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The assignment of subjects into groups was done according to the following process. 
Upon entering the laboratory subjects drew a number from an envelope. The number indicated 
their computer terminal for the experiment. The terminals were randomly matched into 
anonymous groups of four by the server. The composition of each group remained the same 
throughout the experiment. All this was known to the subjects and so was the fact that all 
members of the group faced the same decision problem.  
Each participant was provided a hard copy of instructions that were identical across 
subjects. The instructions for both treatments were neutrally framed. The experimenter read the 
instructions aloud with subjects following the text in their own hard copy. After finishing reading 
the instructions and answering the questions we administered a computerized test to check for 
understanding. The subjects were asked to individually select four numbers (with two numbers 
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being equal) that would represent four contributions. After choosing the four numbers the test 
software asked them to calculate the multipliers and profits for all group members. It did not 
allow them to proceed until they got all the correct answers. 
Then the decision making part of the experiment followed. Each session consisted of 2x15 
rounds to check for the restart effect. After restart the subjects remained in the same group as 
before (partners design). In every round of the play the subjects were endowed with 50 NZ cents 
and had to decide how much of this endowment to allocate to a project and how much to keep for 
themselves. 
The individual round payoffs were computed as the money the subjects kept plus the sum 
allocated to the project by all four members of the group where the latter was multiplied by their 
own personal multiplier. In Rank-Order-VCM treatment the personal multiplier was determined 
depending on the amount the subject contributed towards the project and on the rank order of this 
amount relative to the contributions of the other members of the group. In Random-Rank-VCM 
treatment the multiplier was randomly determined by the computer. The software would draw a 
number 1, 2, 3, or 4 for each participant. The number was drawn with replacement; therefore it 
was possible for the computer to draw the same number for more than one person in the group. 
The subject’s individual multiplier was determined according to the rank of his or her random 
number. In particular, if the subject’s number was the highest in the group, the multiplier was 
0.65; 0.55 if it was the second highest; 0.45 if it was the third; and finally, 0.35 if the number was 
the lowest. 
After each round the subjects received feedback information on the amount they and their 
group allocated to the project. They received information on the individual allocation ordered 
from highest to lowest, but were not be able to trace the amount to the person who allocated it. 
They also received information about their personal multiplier, the resulting payoff from the 
project, the money kept and your round payoff. This information was recorded in a table on the 
subjects’ screen and was available for all past rounds. At restart, the information for the first 15 
rounds was cleared. 
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire on 
demographics and strategies used when making the decisions. Finally, they were privately paid 
their earnings for the sessions. 
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3. Results 
Figure 1 presents the comparison of average contributions in the 2 x 15 periods of the 
Rank-Order-VCM and the Random-Rank-VCM treatments. While the average contribution in the 
Rank-Order-VCM starts at 35.9 and oscillates between 30.1 and 41.8 and is relatively constant, 
the average contribution in the Random-Rank-VCM starts at 25.4 and steadily declines 
throughout the whole experiment to reach its minimum of 6.8 in period 25. In the last period, the 
average contribution is equal to 7.9. The median contribution shows even a sharper contrast: In 
the Rank-Order-VCM, the median contribution is equal to the endowment in all but period 9, 
while in the Random-Rank-VCM the median contribution starts at 24 and drops down to 0 by the 
end of the experiment (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Average contributions in Rank-Order-VCM and Random-Rank-VCM 
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3.1 Treatment effect 
The exact two-tailed Wilcoxon test for independent samples reveals that the group 
contributions in the Rank-Order-VCM and the Random-Rank-VCM are significantly different at 
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5% level for both the first 15 periods (p-value = 0.038) and for the second 15 periods (p-value = 
0.005). Each treatment involved eight independent groups.  The average contribution per group 
member was 38.5 (13.8) in the Rank-Order-VCM and 16.4 (11.5) in the Random-Rank-VCM 
(standard deviation in parentheses). This difference is also statistically significant (p-value = 
0.005). The sample of individual first contributions which involves 32 observations per treatment 
suggests that the differences in contributions are significant right from the beginning; the p-value 
of the two-tailed Wilcoxon test is 0.037. Hence, we can conclude that the Rank-Order-VCM leads 
to significantly higher contributions than the Random-Rank-VCM.  
 
Figure 2. Median contributions in Rank-Order-VCM and Random-Rank-VCM 
0
10
20
30
40
50
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
period
m
ed
ia
n 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
ROVCM
RRVCM
 
 
3.2 Repetition effect 
The stylized facts on the symmetric voluntary contribution mechanism are that initial 
contributions are about 50% of the endowment and decline in the following periods (Ledyard, 
1995). Our results from the Random-Rank-VCM are in line with these stylized facts: As reported 
in the previous section the initial contributions are almost exactly half of the endowment and their 
 
 
10 
decline is significant as shown by the random effects regression of the average group contribution 
on the time trend. The details are presented in Table 1, column (1). The regression involves a 
dummy variable for the restart of the game interacted on the time trend. The decline is significant 
in the original and in the restart game. The difference in contributions between the original and 
the restart game is evident: Each group contributes less in the restart game than in the original 
game. The probability that such an extreme outcome occurs due to chance is 0.008. 
For the Rank-Order-VCM, the average contribution increases from 37.3 to 39.6 between 
the original and the restart game. This difference, however, is not significant; three groups 
increase and three groups decrease their contributions while two groups always contribute their 
full endowment. No significant time trend can be detected by the random effects dummy 
regression in the original or in the restart game for the Rank-Order-VCM. The regression results 
are recorded in Table 1, column (2). Finally, based on the group data we observe that average 
contributions decline significantly more in the Random-Rank-VCM than in the Rank-Order-
VCM (column (3)).  
In summary, we observe no repetition effect in the Rank-Order-VCM and there is a 
significant contribution decline in the Random-Rank-VCM. 
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Table 1. Random-effects dummy regression: average contribution/group on time trend 
    
(column ID) (1) Random-Rank-
VCM 
(2) Rank-Order-
VCM 
(3) Both 
treatments 
Number of observations  240 240 480 
Number of independent observations 8 8 16 
    
Independent variables    
    
Intercept 27.847* 
(4.415) 
[.000] 
39.999* 
(5.195) 
[.000] 
37.708* 
(4.619) 
[.000] 
    
DummyRestart 1.467 
(2.372) 
[.536] 
4.759 
(2.468) 
[.054] 
 
    
Period -.708* 
(.217) 
[.001] 
-.334 
(.221) 
[.131] 
.049 
(.069) 
[.478] 
    
DummyRestart × (period – 15) -.310 
(.275) 
[.259] 
.279 
(.286) 
[.330] 
 
    
DummyRandom-Rank-VCM   -8.929 
(6.532) 
[.172] 
    
DummyRandom-Rank-VCM × (period)   -.847* 
(.098) 
[.000] 
    
Note: estimated coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis); [p-values in brackets]; *significant at 5%.  
 
3.3 Absence of restart effect 
Andreoni and Croson (2008) provide evidence for the symmetric VCM that following a 
surprise restart contributions jump back almost to their initial level after having declined in the 
original game. In our experiment, the restart was pre-announced and so the subjects anticipated 
the restart game. In the absence of surprise, we do not find a significant restart effect. From 
period 15 to period 16 of the Random-Rank-VCM (Rank-Order-VCM), three (four) groups 
increased, three (one) groups decreased and two (four) groups maintained their contributions on 
the same level. The two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-sample test reveals that these changes are not 
statistically significantly different from those that occur between period 14 and 15 (the p-values 
are 0.208 and 0.600 for the Random-Rank-VCM and the Rank-Order-VCM, respectively).  
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3.4 Conditional cooperative behavior 
In the symmetric VCM subjects’ contributions are positively correlated to the lagged 
average contribution of the others (Neugebauer et al., 2009). We observe the same effect for the 
Random-Rank-VCM and find that it is even more pronounced in the Random-Rank-VCM. Table 
2 records the corresponding dummy regression results in columns (4) and (5), which are based on 
the individual data. The data show that contributions are positively correlated to the lagged 
average contributions of the other group members in both treatments. The differences between 
treatments with respect to this evidence of conditional cooperation are not significant as indicated 
by the binary variable for the Rank-Order-VCM interacted on the lagged contributions of others 
(see Table 2 column (6)).  
 
Table 2. Random-effects dummy regression: contribution on lagged others’ average contribution  
    
(column ID) (4) Random-Rank-
VCM 
(5) Rank-Order-
VCM 
(6) Both treatments 
Number of observations  928 928 1856 
Number of individual observations 32 32 64 
    
Independent variables    
    
Intercept 17.882* 
(2.441) 
[.000] 
16.759* 
(4.450) 
[.000] 
9.753* 
(2.031) 
[.000] 
    
Lagged others’ average contribution .176* 
(.063) 
[.005] 
.470* 
(.061) 
[.000] 
.417* 
(.046) 
[.000] 
    
DummyRestart -8.980* 
(1.568) 
[.000] 
-2.861 
(2.354) 
[.224] 
 
    
DummyRestart × lagged others’ 
average contribution 
.115 
(.068) 
[.093] 
-.078 
(.059) 
[.185] 
 
    
DummyRank-Order-VCM   11.447* 
(3.389) 
[.001] 
    
DummyRank-Order-VCM × lagged 
others’ average contribution 
  .009 
(.070) 
[.895] 
    
Note: estimated coefficient (standard errors in parenthesis); [p-values in brackets]; *significant at 5%.  
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4. Discussion 
In this paper we introduce an institution that counters the incentives to free-ride through 
competition within the VCM framework. In particular, we propose Rank-Order-VCM in which 
an individual who contributes more to a group project earns a greater reward resulting from the 
project than an individual who contributes less. We test a conjecture that competition outweighs 
incentives to free-ride and find that Random-Rank-VCM elicits higher contribution levels than 
Random-Rank-VCM where the rewards are allocated randomly. This is likely due to the element 
of competition present in Rank-Order-VCM but not in Random-Rank-VCM. However, one has to 
remember that in such environment the free-riding is not a dominant strategy. Thus a call for 
future research exploring the effects of competition without changing the underlying incentive 
structure (as in a standard VCM) seems warranted. In particular, a natural extension of our design 
would be a situation where history of contributions decides ties. However, competition can be a 
double-edged sword as high-power incentives in certain tournaments schemes can decrease 
contributions and even lead to dysfunctional behavioral responses such as sabotage (Lazear, 
1989, 2000). 
The stylized nature of our experimental design makes the obtained results applicable not 
only to local/impure public goods that are heterogeneous in consumption but also extend to labor 
scenarios involving voluntary and observable contribution of effort. On the other hand, the 
behavior detected in our experiment obviously depends on the implemented parameters and it is 
possible that it might break down under smaller marginal incentives. 
 
References 
 
Andreoni, J. and R. Croson (2008) “Partners versus strangers: random rematching in public goods 
experiments,” in Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith (eds.) Handbook of experimental 
economics results I, North-Holland, 777-783. 
 
Ahn, T.K., M. Isaac and T. C. Salmon (2008) “Endogenous group formation,” Journal of Public 
Economic Theory, 10 (2), 171-194.   
 
Burlando, R. and F. Guala (2005) “Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments,” 
Experimental Economics, 8 (1), 35 – 54. 
 
 
 
14 
Cabrera, S., E. Fatas, J. A. Lacomba and T. Neugebauer (2006) “Vertically splitting a firm – 
Promotion and relegation in a team production experiment,” University of Valencia Working 
Paper. 
 
Chaudhuri, A. and T. Paichayontvijit (2006) “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions 
to a Public Good,” Economics Bulletin, 3 (8), 1-14. 
 
Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot and Putterman, Louis (2005) ”Cooperation under the threat of 
expulsion in a public goods experiment,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1421–1435. 
 
Croson, R., E. Fatás and T. Neugebauer (2007) “Excludability and Contribution: A Laboratory Study 
in Team Production,” Working paper, Wharton. 
 
Dickinson, D. L. (2001) “The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Group Motivation,“ Experimental 
Economics, 4, 107-124.  
 
Dickinson, D. L. and Isaac, M. R. (1999) “Absolute and Relative Rewards for Individuals in Team 
Production,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 19: 299-310. 
 
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Keser, Claudia (1999) “Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run.” CIRANO 
Working Paper 99s-24. 
 
Falkinger, J., E. Fehr, S. Gächter, and R. Winter-Ebner (2000) “A Simple Mechanism for the 
Efficient Provision of Public Goods – Experimental Evidence,” American Economic Review, 
90, 247-264. 
 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,” 
American Economic Review, 90 (4), 980-94. 
 
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter, and E. Fehr (2001) “Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence 
from a Public Goods Experiment,” Economics Letters, 71(3), 397-404. 
 
Gächter, S. and C. Thöni (2005) “Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation among Like-Minded 
People,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3), 303-14. 
 
Gunnthorsdottir, A., D. Houser, and K. McCabe (2007) “Dispositions, history and contributions in 
public goods experiments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(2), 304–315. 
 
Gunnthorsdottir, A., R. Vragov, S. Seifert & K. McCabe (2009) “Near-efficient equilibria in 
collaborative meritocracies,” working paper. 
 
Harbring, C. and Irlenbusch, B. (2005) “Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize 
Selection,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161(4), 636-663.  
 
Isaac, R., K. McCue, and C. Plott (1985) “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51-74. 
 
Isaac, R. and J. Walker, (1988a) “Communication and Free Riding Behaviour: The Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism,” Economic Inquiry, 26 (4), 585-608. 
 
 
15 
 
Isaac, R. and J. Walker (1988b) “Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 179-99. 
 
Keser, C. and F. van Winden (2000) “Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public 
Goods,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23-39. 
 
Kosfeld, M. and A. Riedl (2004) “The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for 
Sustaining Cooperation,” Working paper, University Amsterdam. 
 
Kurzban, R. and D. Houser (2005) “An Experimental Investigation of Cooperative Types in Human 
Groups: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulations”, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 102(5), 1803-1807.  
 
Lazear, E. (1989) “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 561-580. 
 
Lazear, E. (2000) “The Power of Incentives,” American Economic Review, vol. 90(2), 410-414. 
 
Ledyard, O. (1995) “Public Goods: Some Experimental Results,” Ch. 2 in J. Kagel and A. Roth (Eds) 
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Maier-Rigaud, F., P. Martinsson, and G. Staffiero (2005) Ostracism and the provision of a public 
good. Mimeo. Max Planck Society.   
 
Masclet, D., C. Noussair, S. Tucker and M. Villeval (2003) ”Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment 
in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” American Economic Review, 93 (1), 366-380. 
 
Neugebauer, T., J. Perote, U. Schmidt, and M. Loos (2009) ”Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: 
On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments, Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 30, 52-60. 
 
Noussair, C. and S. Tucker (2005) “Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote 
Cooperation”, Economic Inquiry, 43 (3), 649-60. 
 
Orrison, A., Schotter, A. and Weigelt, Keith (2004) “Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental 
Examination” Management Science, 50, 268-279. 
 
Page, T., L. Putterman, and B. Unel (2005) “Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: 
Reciprocity, Mimicry, and Efficiency,” Economic Journal, 115, 1032-53. 
 
Scotchmer, S. “Local Public Goods and Clubs,” In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds. Handbook of 
Public Economics, Vol IV. Ch. 29, 1997-2042, Amsterdam: North-Holland Press, 2002. 
 
 
 
16 
Appendix 
A.1. Instructions Rank-Order-VCM 
 
The purpose of the experiment is to study how people make decisions. From now until the end of 
the experiment, unauthorized communication of any kind between participants is prohibited. If 
you want to ask any question, please raise your hand first. Please turn off your cell-phone and do 
not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If 
you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
 
In the experiment you will earn money according to your decisions and the decisions taken by the 
other participants. At the end of the experiment you will be privately paid the sum of your 
payoffs during the experiment. 
 
With whom do you interact? 
 
1. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are randomly assigned to groups of 
four. The composition of each group remains the same throughout the experiment, but the 
identity of the participants in the group will not be revealed to you at any time.  
2. The experiment consists of thirty rounds. After the first fifteen rounds, there will be a 
restart of another fifteen rounds. 
 
What do you have to do? 
3. In every round you are endowed with 50 Cents. You have to decide how to use this 
endowment; what amount you allocate to a Project and how much you keep for yourself. 
The other three participants in your group face the same decision problem.  
4. The money you allocate to the Project generates payoff to you and to every other 
participant in your group. The money you keep generates payoff only to you. 
 
What will you earn? 
5. In every round, your payoff will be computed as follows. 
 
Your round payoff 
= 
the money you keep for yourself 
+ 
the sum allocated to the Project by the four participants in your group 
× 
your multiplier 
 
6. Your multiplier is determined by the amount you allocate to the Project and the amount 
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allocated by the other participants in your group. Given the allocation of the others in your 
group, the higher your allocation to the Project, the higher are your chances for a larger 
multiplier in that round. In particular: 
o If your allocation is the highest in the group, your multiplier is 0.65.  
o If your allocation is the second highest, your multiplier is 0.55. 
o If your allocation is the third highest, your multiplier is 0.45. 
o If your allocation is the lowest, your multiplier is 0.35. 
 
7. In case of a tie, i.e., if two or more participants allocate the same amount to the Project, 
the corresponding multipliers are averaged. For instance, if the second highest allocation 
is equal to the third highest, the multiplier for the two participants is 0.5 [= (0.55 + 
0.45)/2]. Hence, participants who allocate the same amount to the Project get the same 
payoff. 
 
How do you make your decisions? 
8. In each round, you make your decision on the computer by entering an amount into the 
input field on the screen (you can select the input field with the mouse). Next you press 
the OK button (with the mouse) to confirm your decision. Note: After you have confirmed 
your decision you can not revise it anymore. 
 
What information will you receive? 
9. After each round you receive feedback information on the amount you and your group 
allocated to the Project. You receive information on the individual allocation ordered from 
highest to lowest, but you will not be able to trace the amount to the person who allocated 
it. You also receive information about your multiplier, the resulting payoff from the 
Project, the Money kept, and your round payoff.  
10. This information is recorded in a table on your screen and will be available to you for all 
past rounds. At restart, the information for the first 15 rounds is cleared. 
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A.2. Instructions Random-Rank-VCM 
 
The purpose of the experiment is to study how people make decisions. From now until the end of 
the experiment, unauthorized communication of any kind between participants is prohibited. If 
you want to ask any question, please raise your hand first. Please turn off your cell-phone and do 
not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If 
you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
 
In the experiment you will earn money according to your decisions and the decisions taken by the 
other participants. At the end of the experiment you will be privately paid the sum of your 
payoffs during the experiment. 
 
With whom do you interact? 
1. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are randomly assigned to groups of 
four. The composition of each group remains the same throughout the experiment, but the 
identity of the participants in the group will not be revealed to you at any time.  
2. The experiment consists of thirty rounds. After the first fifteen rounds, there will be a 
restart of another fifteen rounds. 
 
What do you have to do? 
3. In every round you are endowed with 50 Cents. You have to decide how to use this 
endowment; what amount you allocate to a Project and how much you keep for yourself. 
The other three participants in your group face the same decision problem.  
4. The money you allocate to the Project generates payoff to you and to every other 
participant in your group. The money you keep generates payoff only to you. 
 
What will you earn? 
5. In every round, your payoff will be computed as follows. 
 
Your round payoff 
= 
the money you keep for yourself 
+ 
the sum allocated to the Project by the four participants in your group 
× 
your multiplier 
 
6. In each round your multiplier is randomly determined by the computer; the computer 
draws a number 1, 2, 3, or 4 for each participant. The number is drawn with replacement; 
therefore it is possible for the computer to draw the same number for more than one 
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person in your group. Your multiplier is determined according to the rank of your random 
number. In particular: 
a. If your random number is the highest in the group, your multiplier is 0.65.  
b. If your random number is the second highest, your multiplier is 0.55. 
c. If your random number is the third highest, your multiplier is 0.45. 
d. If your random number is the lowest, your multiplier is 0.35. 
 
7. In case of a draw, i.e., if two or more participants’ random number is the same, the 
corresponding multipliers are averaged. For instance, if the second highest random 
number is equal to the third highest, the multiplier for the two participants is 0.5 [(= 0.55 
+ 0.45)/2]. You are informed about your multiplier only at the end of the period. Hence, 
you make your decision about your allocation without knowing the exact value of your 
multiplier. 
 
8. In case of a tie, i.e., if two or more participants allocate the same amount to the Project, 
the corresponding multipliers are averaged. For instance, if the second highest allocation 
is equal to the third highest, the multiplier for the two participants is 0.5 [= (0.55 + 
0.45)/2]. Hence, participants who allocate the same amount to the Project get the same 
payoff. 
 
How do you make your decisions? 
9. In each round, you make your decision on the computer by entering an amount into the 
input field on the screen (you can select the input field with the mouse). Next you press 
the OK button (with the mouse) to confirm your decision. Note: After you have confirmed 
your decision you can not revise it anymore. 
 
What information will you receive? 
10. After each round you receive feedback information on the amount you and your group 
allocated to the Project. You receive information on the individual allocation ordered from 
highest to lowest, but you will not be able to trace the amount to the person who allocated 
it. You also receive information about your multiplier, the resulting payoff from the 
Project, the Money kept, and your round payoff.  
11. This information is recorded in a table on your screen and will be available to you for all 
past rounds. At restart, the information for the first 15 rounds is cleared. 
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